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Intelligence Report

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CUBAN ECONOMIC MISSION TO THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH

March 23, 1961

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This report is based on information available through March 15, 1961.

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In a determined quest for additional economic assistance to bolster Cuba's sagging economy and to offset the likely loss of the US sugar market, a high-level Cuban economic mission undertook an extensive sweep through the Sino-Soviet bloc in the latter part of 1960 and early 1961.

During the course of its three-month tour (October 23 - January 18), the delegation, headed by Cuban National Bank President "Che" Guevara and Deputy Foreign Minister Rodriguez Llompart, visited every country in the bloc and signed political, economic, or cultural agreements with them. By the end of the visit, Cuba had trade and payments agreements and cultural ties with every country in the bloc, diplomatic relations with every country except East Germany, and scientific and technical assistance accords with all but Albania. In addition, the Guevara mission negotiated an increase in total bloc credits to Cuba from \$128 million to nearly a quarter of a billion dollars, secured a bloc commitment to purchase about 70 percent of Cuba's anticipated 1961 sugar production, and witnessed the creation of a unique multilateral payments system enabling the Castro regime to utilize the proceeds of its sugar sales through purchases of goods from any European communist country and Communist China.

In the political sphere, the visit was marked throughout by effusive expressions of Cuban-bloc friendship and solidarity; red-carpet treatment and conferences with top bloc leaders at every stop; and unusually cordial joint communiquees stressing, in language usually reserved for intra-bloc agreements, a close identity of views both in bilateral matters and on international questions. The mission was proclaimed a major success by Guevara and Cuban and bloc propagandists despite reports of Cuban disappointment over the USSR's refusal to advance additional dollar financing to offset an apparent shortfall in Cuba's 1961 import requirements.

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~~SECRET~~CUBAN ECONOMIC MISSION TO THE SINO-SOVIET BLOCI. POLITICAL AND CULTURAL TIES

While the chief preoccupation of the Cuban delegation was with economic matters, the underlying political nature of the three month visit (October 23 - January 18) was not obscured. In a January 7 speech in Havana reporting on the results of his mission, Guevara candidly avowed the political motives behind the economic agreements concluded as constituting the bloc response to the United States' decision to end sugar imports from Cuba. To forestall the economic collapse of the Castro regime, the bloc adopted a number of novel and possibly uneconomic measures which showed graphically the lengths to which the communists are prepared to go to preserve their Latin American beachhead.

A. Diplomatic and Cultural Agreements

Aside from the political overtones implicit in the economic agreements concluded between the bloc and Cuba during the Guevara tour, there were other developments which helped to further cement political relations with the Castro regime. Agreements to establish diplomatic relations were negotiated with North Vietnam (December 2), Outer Mongolia (December 7), Albania (December 15), and Hungary (December 18). While the diplomatic accord with Albania was handled independently of the Guevara mission, the conclusion of these agreements means that Cuba now maintains formal ties with every bloc country except East Germany. Diplomatic relations with East Germany were not established evidently out of fear that such a move would result in the rupture of relations with West Germany and would place trade relations with the Bonn government in jeopardy. However, on his departure from East Germany on December 17, Guevara declared that Cuba and the East German regime would establish relations "at the proper time ... and with due regard for their mutual interests."

In the field of cultural relations, several agreements were signed during the Guevara tour where no prior agreements existed or where previous accords needed changing. Among those bloc countries with which the Guevara mission negotiated on cultural matters were Communist China, the Soviet Union, Outer Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam, Bulgaria, and Albania. By the middle of January, Cuba had cultural exchange agreements with every country in the bloc.

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B. Joint Communiques

Joint communiques, stressing bloc-Cuban friendship and solidarity, were signed by the Guevara delegation with several bloc countries including the USSR and Communist China. The Chinese-Cuban communique, signed on November 30, with its professions of common international objectives and unbreakable friendship, was cast in language similar to those signed between bloc countries. The communique noted an identity of views on such issues as "the current international situation, opposition to US activities in Laos and the Congo," and expressed the hope that the "development of close relations between China and Cuba will promote friendship between China and other Latin American countries."

A noteworthy feature of Guevara's visit to Beijing was his apparent siding with the Chinese on several key points in the Sino-Soviet dispute. At a November 21 rally in Peiping, the Cuban leader in effect backed the Chinese view of active revolutionary struggle by communist parties, as opposed to Moscow's emphasis on a gradual acquisition of power, when he stated that Cuba achieved its "present beautiful reality ...neither by resorting to the method of the ballot box nor the method of establishing his majesty's opposition party" but "by her people's armed struggle" and by "smashing the troops...of the puppet (Batista) dictatorship...."

Speaking at a November 20 reception, Guevara praised Communist China's commune movement (which has come under Soviet attack) and two days earlier held up the Chinese Communist revolution as an "example" which has "revealed a new road for the Americas." Guevara made no such statement about the USSR's example while in Moscow.

The Soviet-Cuban communique, signed on December 19, contained lavish praise for Soviet economic, scientific and social progress. It noted Cuban gratitude for Soviet economic assistance and, "most important," for the USSR's "full support" for Cuba in upholding its independence "in the face of aggression." The communique also cited Cuba as "an example for other peoples of the American continent, and also Asia and Africa." In addition, the document repeated familiar charges of US hostility toward the Castro regime and restated established Soviet positions on the Congo, Laos, and the admission of the CPR and Outer Mongolia to the United Nations.

The absence from the communique of a call for action regarding the US naval base at Guantanamo and a denial that Soviet or Cuban actions endanger world peace probably reflect the Soviet hope that Cuba can serve as a bridgehead of communist influence in Latin America without, however, provoking armed intervention.

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As in every other bloc country, Guevara received red-carpet treatment during each of his three stopovers in Moscow. During the October Revolution (November 7) parade he was placed prominently in the first row of the reviewing stand along with Soviet Presidium members and bloc communist party chiefs. Soviet enthusiasm for the Castro regime was also demonstrated during Kozlov's November 6 speech at Kuzhnikii stadium when a reference to the Cuban revolution evoked prolonged applause and brought Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders to their feet to add their personal accolade to Guevara, seated directly behind them.

C. Missiles and Military Hardware

No explicit announcement for provision of additional bloc military assistance was forthcoming during the visit; yet it may be assumed that the subject was discussed and delivery of new weapons agreed upon. According to one report, Guevara, early in his tour, asked Khrushchev for missiles and the Soviet Premier flatly refused, promising instead some automatic weapons from World War II.

II. GUEVARA'S TRIP THROUGH EASTERN EUROPE AND THE USSR

The visit of the Guevara mission to the East European satellites and the USSR did not yield major economic gains for the Castro regime but gave the bloc a significantly tighter grip on Cuba's economy.

A. Credit and Trade Agreements

Between the time that the full mission arrived in Prague on October 23, 1960, and the final departure of one section of it, led by Deputy Foreign Minister Rodriguez Llompart, from Tirana on January 18, 1961, various long-term trade agreements, 1961 trade protocols, and technical assistance agreements had been negotiated between Cuba and every one of the European bloc countries including the Soviet Union. Guevara is reported to have been unsuccessful in several different efforts to obtain \$300 million in new credits from the Soviets. He did, however, secure about \$60 million in new credits from some of the European satellites which, with another \$60 million from Communist China, brought the total of bloc credits to Cuba up to nearly one-quarter of a billion dollars by the end of January 1961.

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B. Sugar Purchases

In addition to specific credit and trade agreements, which are covered below, the Guevara mission was awarded a number of other economic accommodations ranging from promises to buy Cuban sugar at the subsidy price of four cents per pound to the convenience of virtually bloc-wide multilateralism in settling Cuban trade balances.

After Guevara had arrived in Moscow a special meeting of bloc economic and trade experts was reportedly convened to establish an integrated bloc program to aid Cuba in solving its economic problems, particularly as a result of Cuba's increasing isolation from normal sources of supply in the United States and other free world countries. At this meeting it was apparently decided that the bloc would raise its purchase to four million tons of Cuban sugar during 1961, i.e., roughly 70 percent of Cuba's anticipated 1961 crop. Purchase of the four million tons was divided mainly between the USSR and Communist China, Moscow agreeing to buy an additional 1.7 million tons over and above the one million for which it was already committed. The Chinese Communists also agreed to take one million tons, leaving a remaining 300,000 to be purchased by various satellites.

In the announcements of bloc plans to buy Cuban sugar, it was interesting to note that bloc officials, by agreeing with Guevara to buy Cuban sugar at four cents per pound, had given the Castro regime a built-in subsidy of three-quarters of one cent per pound over the world market price. Recent reports, however, have indicated that this subsidy can very well be offset by higher prices which Cuba will be required to pay for bloc goods.

C. Multilateral Payments System

Probably the most unusual economic aid arrangement made with Guevara was the creation of a multilateral payments system designed to give the Castro regime the maximum convenience in liquidating the proceeds from its sales of sugar to various bloc countries. Although complete details of this arrangement have not yet been revealed, statements made in some of Guevara's speeches indicate that Cuba will be able to use the receipts from its sale of sugar to purchase goods from any European satellite, the USSR, and Communist China. The Cuban peso, valued at one US dollar, will be the unit for clearing.

This multilateral clearing procedure is, on the basis of available information, the only one now in existence involving nearly the entire Soviet bloc. (North Korea, North Vietnam, and Outer Mongolia are excluded.) A similar arrangement with Finland was abandoned several years ago. Under normal procedure, trade agreements between Soviet bloc and free world

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countries, or between one bloc country and another, are strictly bilateral, although on several occasions experiments in multilateralism between several different bloc countries have been attempted. That Moscow was prepared to grant Cuba this special privilege appeared to be still another indication of the high priority Cuba enjoys in Soviet plans. It also predicated even greater Cuban dependence on the Sino-Soviet bloc in its foreign trade and its entire economy, more so than any other less-developed non-bloc country.

D. Other Accommodations to Cuba

Another accommodation to Cuban needs appeared in Guevara's announcement that Soviet and satellite plants would make certain changes in their manufacturing standards to meet Cuban requirements, i.e., products being produced for Cuba would conform with Cuba's system of weights and measures, which is based on pounds rather than on the metric system. Electrical machinery and appliances will also be adapted to 60 cycles instead of 50 as used throughout Eastern Europe. Guevara did indicate, however, that in time it was expected that Cuba would change its standards to conform with those used in the Soviet bloc.

A further result of the Guevara mission was an announcement that 2,400 Cubans would soon be sent to the USSR and other bloc countries for technical training. About one third of them will go to the USSR, some 200 to Communist China, and 180 to East Germany. In addition, 30 Chinese Communist technicians are scheduled to visit Cuba to instruct in the manufacture of paper and pulp from sugar cane.

The capacity of the East European satellites to take significant quantities of Cuban sugar remains doubtful. All of them, with the possible exception of Albania, are virtually self-sufficient in sugar as a result of their own sugar beet production, although East Germany is temporarily short because of a bad crop in 1960. The various satellite communiques on the signing of trade protocols with Cuba have either ignored or made only brief reference to possible imports of Cuban sugar, and there have been indications that some of the imports may be re-exported. An official Hungarian commercial journal, Kulkereskedelem, commented in December 1960: "Hungary as a sugar exporting country is unable to purchase Cuban sugar for her own needs, yet in the spirit and the frame of the inter-nation agreement is willing to help sell Cuban sugar."

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III. AGREEMENTS WITH INDIVIDUAL EUROPEAN BLOC COUNTRIES

The individual economic agreements negotiated by the Guevara mission with the USSR and each of the European satellites were in some cases supplementary to previous trade, credit, and economic aid agreements which had been signed with the Castro regime. In the case of Albania, they established a new connection. There is no doubt, however, that their overall, net effect is to bind Cuba more tightly to the Soviet world than ever before and to provide a solid economic framework for its eventual establishment as a Latin American satellite or "people's republic." A general description of the economic agreements concluded by the Guevara mission with the USSR and all of the European satellites follows in the approximate order of their negotiation and signing.

A. Czechoslovakia

The Guevara mission made two visits to Prague, the first en route to Moscow (October 23-29) and the second (December 20-23) on its way back to Cuba after having visited the USSR and the Far East. During the October visit Cuba was given a new \$20 million credit in addition to a previous credit of \$20 million which had been extended on June 10, 1960. During the December visit a 1961 trade protocol was signed, together with a general agreement on economic cooperation. The trade protocol called for an expanded range of exports from Cuba to Czechoslovakia during 1961, although it is presumed that sugar is not one of these items since Czechoslovakia had a favorable sugar beet harvest during 1960 and has been a net exporter of sugar over the past few years.

Among the principal Cuban exports to Czechoslovakia during 1961 will be nonferrous ores and concentrates, coffee, tobacco, cocoa, tropical fruits, and skins. Czech exports will include various industrial products and equipment, trucks, tractors, textile products, chemicals, ceramics, glass and paper. Although specific quantities or target levels for exports are not given, it is believed that a fairly large increase over current or past levels is projected. It is also expected that capital goods may comprise an increasing share of the Czechoslovak exports to Cuba since Czechoslovakia is scheduled to build 14 different manufacturing plants in Cuba over the next several years.

Deliveries for one plant for the construction of consumer durables are scheduled to begin in 1961. The plant, which will be at Santa Clara, is to have a production capacity of 40,000 refrigerators and 45,000 stoves per year. There have, however, been some reports that the USSR will construct some of the plants originally scheduled to be built by Czechoslovakia, and it now appears that Czechoslovakia will concentrate primarily on the establishment of a motor vehicle industry.

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B. East Germany

The full Guevara mission arrived in East Berlin from Moscow on December 13 and remained in East Germany for the next four days. On December 17 it was announced that a long-term Cuban-East German trade agreement through 1965 had been concluded and that a detailed protocol for 1961 had also been signed. Previously Cuba had had only an inter-bank agreement with East Germany which had been drawn up in the early spring of 1960. The 1961 agreement provides for total trade of \$45 million. East German exports to Cuba are to total \$25 million and Cuban exports to East Germany \$20 million. Planned East German deliveries to the Castro regime were described in the official communique issued at the end of the visit as "very extensive." During 1961 East Germany will deliver to Cuba 17 complete industrial plants, mainly for the development of Cuban light industry. Cuban deliveries to East Germany will include sisal, tobacco, coffee, honey, chromium, nickel oxides, and sugar.

An agreement giving Cuba an East German credit for \$12 million and a separate agreement on East German-Cuban scientific and technical cooperation were also signed. Furthermore, it was announced that Cuba will be represented at the 1961 Leipzig fair for the first time. Most of the credit will presumably be used to cover costs of equipment and installation of the various industrial enterprises mentioned above.

C. The USSR

The Guevara mission visited Moscow three times during its extensive tour through the bloc. It arrived there first from Prague on October 29 and remained until November 16 before leaving for Peiping; returned to Moscow from North Korea on December 8, remaining through December 13; and returned again from Budapest on December 18 before leaving for Prague on December 20.

On December 19, 1960, it was announced in Moscow that the USSR had concluded four general agreements and one trade protocol with Cuba. The four agreements stipulated (1) that the USSR would, under the \$100 million credit granted to Cuba on February 13, 1960, render technical assistance to Cuba's iron and steel, oil and power industries; (2) that Cubans would be trained in the Soviet Union; (3) that the Cuban peso (officially equal to one US dollar) would serve as the clearing currency for multilateral payments agreements between Cuba and bloc countries; and (4) that both countries would promote increased cultural exchanges.

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The trade protocol for the year 1961 specified that Cuban exports to the Soviet Union would include raw sugar, nickel oxide, hides, and fresh and canned fruit. Soviet exports to Cuba are to include oil and petroleum products, wheat, fertilizers, chemicals, steel, machinery, equipment, and foodstuffs. No specific figures were given as to the actual volume of trade called for by the protocol.

Of even greater interest than the agreements and the protocol was an announcement that the USSR intended to buy as much as 1.7 million Spanish long tons of Cuban sugar in addition to the one million tons called for by the Soviet-Cuban trade agreement of February 1960 -- if the United States were to completely suspend Cuba's sugar quota for 1961. The announcement stated that the USSR would reduce the 1.7 million ton figure by the amount the US decided to buy but would nevertheless remain committed to buy at least one million tons. The announced price for all 1961 Soviet sugar purchases was also a spectacular development, -- four cents per English pound, a figure that is at least three-fourths of one cent above the current world price.

Another result of Guevara's visit to Moscow was the announcement that Cuba and the Soviet Union had signed firm contracts covering the Soviet purchase of one million tons of sugar and Cuba's purchase of 4.4 million tons of Soviet crude oil and petroleum products during the year 1961. At the announced price of four cents per pound for Cuban sugar and the prevailing price for crude and petroleum products, the total value of this exchange would appear to be about \$160 million.

D. Poland

On December 18 Castro's Deputy Foreign Minister, Hector Rodriguez Llompart, accompanied by several members of the delegation, arrived in Warsaw from East Berlin to conduct negotiations with Poland and during the next several weeks with Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania. After four days of negotiations, a long-term trade agreement was signed extending the existing Polish-Cuban trade and payments agreement through 1965, together with a separate protocol for trade during 1961. The 1961 protocol calls for trade valued at \$22 million each way, although this figure has been reported to be an outside limit, with actual trade for 1961 expected to be in the range of \$10-\$12 million each way.

Poland is to export electrical equipment, agricultural and mining machinery, railway rolling stock, machine tools and transport equipment, as well as certain agricultural products such as potato flour and bacon, and a variety of consumer goods such as radios, gas and kitchen ranges, and textiles. Cuba is to export manganese ore, copper concentrates, hides and fibers.

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Besides the long-term trade agreement and 1961 protocol, an economic aid agreement was also signed which provides for Polish delivery to Cuba of an unspecified number of industrial enterprises. They are to include a shipyard, factories for producing batteries and nails, and a meat packing and processing plant.

No mention of a Polish credit to Cuba was made in the official communique issued at the end of the Rodriguez Llompart visit or in Polish press articles, in rather significant contrast to the fact that credits were extended to the Cuban delegation by every other European satellite except Albania. There have, however, been subsequent reports that a Polish credit was offered (and presumably accepted) extending over an eight-year period at 1.5 percent interest. The exact amount of this reported credit is not certain. Polish Government reluctance to announce any credits to the Castro regime may well arise from concern over possible United States disapproval and the possible withdrawal of a US credit to Poland now under consideration.

E. Hungary

The full Guevara mission spent only about 24 hours in Budapest, arriving on December 17 and leaving the evening of the next day for Moscow. During their brief stay in Hungary it was announced that new commercial and credit agreements would be negotiated shortly. Accordingly, the section of the Guevara mission headed by Deputy Foreign Minister, Hector Rodriguez Llompart arrived in Budapest from Warsaw on December 24. On December 31 the Llompart group signed a new trade protocol between Cuba and Hungary for 1961 and a new agreement giving Cuba a Hungarian credit of \$7 million. The new credit agreement raised Cuba's credit line in Hungary to \$15 million, since it supplemented an \$8 million credit extended by the Kadar regime to Cuba in September 1960.

About \$10 million of this credit will be used to buy Hungarian telecommunications equipment and to provide technical aid for the establishment of workshops to repair agricultural machinery. The principal commodities to be exchanged under the trade agreement will be Hungarian exports of machine tools, refrigeration equipment, tractors, dumptrucks, various instruments, chemical, pharmaceutical, and industrial products, and Cuban exports to Hungary of nickel oxides, copper concentrates, hides, tire yarns, staple fibers, and sugar.

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F. Rumania

The Rodriguez Llompart section of the Guevara mission arrived in Bucharest from Budapest on January 2, 1961, and during the next five days, as in Hungary, negotiated both a credit and a 1961 trade protocol. On January 7 the Rumanian Government announced that it had extended the Castro regime a credit in the amount of \$15 million "on advantageous terms" part of which will cover the purchase of Rumanian tractors and agricultural machinery. No previous credits had been extended to Cuba by Rumania, although a five-year trade agreement between two countries had been negotiated in October 1960. The trade protocol negotiated by the Rodriguez Llompart group covers the year 1961.

Rumanian exports to Cuba are to include oil field equipment, machinery for road building, chemical products, mineral oils, compressors for a refrigeration plant, agricultural foodstuffs, and 2,000 tractors. Rumania is to buy Cuban sugar, nickel oxides, tire cords, coffee and various foodstuffs. The protocol also provides for Rumanian technical and scientific assistance to Cuba, and technical training for Cuban workers both in Cuba and in Rumania. Cuban students will also be trained in Rumanian universities. As in Hungary, an agreement for exchange of television programs was also signed one day prior to the signing of the commercial agreement.

G. Bulgaria

Arriving in Sofia on January 17, 1961, the Rodriguez Llompart group concluded its visit to Bulgaria on January 12 with the signing of a 1961 trade protocol. A Bulgarian credit to Cuba of \$5 million was also announced, mainly to cover the costs of installing 14 complete industrial enterprises which Bulgaria is to construct in Cuba under the terms of a technical assistance agreement also concluded on January 12. The 14 industrial enterprises will include a transformer plant, a plant for the production of calcium carbide, ten hydroelectric plants each with a capacity of 5,000 kilowatts, and two food processing factories.

Bulgarian exports to Cuba during 1961 will include machinery and industrial equipment, electric motors, drugs, foodstuffs and chemicals in exchange for Cuban coffee, hides, shoes, manganese and other ores, and sugar. Sugar exports to Bulgaria for 1961 were specifically fixed at 40,000 tons which is approximately equal to Bulgarian consumption for one year. Planned Bulgarian sugar production for 1960, from sugar beets, was 250,000 tons. It therefore seems not improbable that some of the Cuban sugar sent to Bulgaria, as in the case of the other satellites, will be re-exported.

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It was also agreed that 20 Cuban students would study in Bulgarian universities and that 100 Cuban workers would come to Bulgaria for technical training.

H. Albania

The Rodriguez Llompart group arrived in Tirana on January 12 from Sofia to begin commercial negotiations with the only remaining Sino-Soviet bloc satellite having no economic ties with the Castro regime. On January 16 a long-term trade agreement from 1961 through 1965 was signed, together with a specific protocol for 1961.

Albanian exports to Cuba are to include petroleum, textiles, handicraft articles, and foodstuffs, in exchange for Cuban sugar, coffee, hides and other items. An Albanian Government trade delegation was also invited to visit Cuba. No credit or technical assistance agreement was announced, and in view of the primitive state of the Albanian economy it appears highly unlikely that, as possibly in Poland, any covert arrangements were made. Rodriguez Llompart and his party left Tirana for Cuba on January 18.

IV. VISIT TO ASIA COMMUNIST AREAS

Guevara or members of his mission visited all of the Asian members of the bloc and signed economic agreements with them. The most important of these agreements were those with Communist China.

"Che" Guevara's mission to Communist China was successful in receiving substantial Chinese aid and trade commitments. Peiping announced on November 30, 1960, that it had agreed to provide Cuba with an interest-free credit of 240 million rubles (estimated to be \$60 million), to be used between 1961 and 1965. Guevara subsequently stated that under the credit China would supply Cuba with 24 factories, including factories for the manufacture of paper, hydrochloric acid, cardboard, insecticides, and textiles. Details in regard to the repayment terms of the credit have not been announced.

In addition to the credit agreement, Peiping agreed to purchase one million Spanish long tons of Cuban sugar in 1961 in exchange for an equivalent amount of Chinese goods, doubling the amount of sugar the Chinese agreed to purchase annually for five years under a trade agreement signed in July 1960. The economic aid agreement, together with a scientific and technical cooperation agreement signed last July, will probably result in the influx of a large number of Chinese Communist technicians into Cuba.

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Upon the completion of its negotiations in Communist China, the mission broke into two groups. One group, led by Rodriguez Llompart, went to North Vietnam and Outer Mongolia, while the rest, led by Guevara, went to North Korea. In all three countries the Cubans negotiated trade, payments, and scientific and technical assistance agreements. Under the trade agreements, North Korea and North Vietnam will reportedly obtain 20,000 tons and 5,000 tons respectively of Cuban sugar. Aside from increasing the sales of its sugar, these agreements will probably have little real economic significance for Cuba.

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Appendix A

Itinerary of the "Che" Guevara Mission to the Sino-Soviet Bloc

Prague - October 23-29
Moscow - October 29 - November 16
Peiping - November 17 - December 1
Pyongyang - December 1-7
Moscow - December 8-13
East Germany - December 13-17
Budapest - December 17-18
Moscow - December 18-20
Prague - December 20-22
Havana - December 23

Rodriguez Llompart

Hanoi - November 30 - December 4
Ulan Bator - December 5-7
Warsaw - December 18-22
Budapest - December 23 - January 2
Bucharest - January 2-7
Sofia - January 7-12
Tirana - January 12-18
Havana - January 19

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Appendix BDiplomatic Relations Established During the Tour

North Vietnam	December 2, 1960
Outer Mongolia	December 7, 1960
*Albania	December 15, 1960
Hungary	December 18, 1960

* Diplomatic relations with Albania were negotiated independently of the Guevara mission.

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